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**RELIGION, SOCIAL MOBILITY AND EDUCATION
IN SCOTLAND**

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Abstract

The relationship among religion, education and social mobility in Scotland is analysed statistically using the Scottish Household Survey of 2001. The large sample size allows much greater statistical power for this purpose than any previous source, and thus allows a more reliable assessment of claims that the stratifying effect of religion in Scotland may have declined. The main questions investigated are: what are the religious differences in the distributions of class origins and class destinations, in the movement between these (absolute mobility), and in the association of these (relative mobility, or social fluidity)? Do changes in social fluidity across cohorts vary among people with different religious affiliation? Are there religious differences in the association of origins and education, in the association of education and destinations, or in the role of education in social fluidity, and do any of these vary over cohorts? The conclusions are that, in younger cohorts, there is no religious difference in social status, and that in older cohorts Catholics are generally of lower status than Protestants and the non-religious. Social fluidity does not, however, vary among religious groups, even for older cohorts, and does not change over time. The reason for convergence in social status of religious groups over time is probably the equalising of educational attainment among the groups: there is no evidence for any of the cohorts that the labour-market rewards to credentials differ by religion.

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RELIGION, SOCIAL MOBILITY AND EDUCATION IN SCOTLAND

Introduction

The relationship among religion, education and opportunity has been a recurrent theme in debates about Scottish social policy since the 1920s, and has recently acquired a new salience following controversy about the possibility that Scottish society might harbour remnants of religious sectarianism even while being ostensibly secular to an unprecedented extent. In these recent and older debates, there is no disagreement that the main religious divide is between Catholics and others, whether the non-religious, the adherents of the presbyterian Church of Scotland, or affiliates to other small Christian groups ranging from the Anglican Episcopal Church to the variety of smaller presbyterian churches. (Only recently have there been in Scotland any sizeable numbers of members of non-Christian religions, and even now the numbers are comparatively very small.) There is also agreement that Catholics mostly have their family origins ultimately in migrant labour from Ireland to Scotland in the second half of the nineteenth century, and that there was a great deal of discrimination in the labour market against Catholics at least in the period between the two world wars with a legacy into the 1950s (Brown 1997: 118-22; Devine 1999: 486-500; Fitzpatrick 1986: 17-42; Rosie 2001; Treble 1978, 1980). The recent controversies have been much more about the culture of various religious communities than about objective measures of social class and social opportunity (see, for example, the papers in Devine (2000)), but insofar as these structural topics underpin claims that discrimination against Catholics persists there continues to be an interest in whether opportunities really have widened. Because analysis of opportunity tends to be based on survey and census data, and therefore to be more amenable to consensual debate than the analysis of ideology, the range of conclusions reached by recent researchers on such matters is in fact quite small, stretching essentially from those who maintain that labour market discrimination has ended (Bruce et al 2004; Paterson 2000a,b) to those who conclude that the persistence of such legacies allows for the possibility that more widespread discrimination could be resurrected (Williams and Walls 2000).

There is wide agreement also, though, that if there has been a widening of opportunity to Catholics then it is likely to be attributable to two broad changes. One is changes in the labour market, whereby small, family-owned firms were replaced by branch plants of UK or international companies, recruiting more meritocratically. That in turn then depends on the second change, the improvement in Catholics' educational attainment largely through the academic success of the distinctive system of Catholic schools. These have their origins in the Education (Scotland) Act of 1918, which brought almost all the Catholic schools under the control of the public authorities (in contrast to the maintenance of a voluntary or independent denominational sector in other parts of the UK and of Europe). Access to public funds itself helped to improve the quality of the Catholic schools, allowing an extensive Catholic secondary sector to be developed for the first time (Fitzpatrick 1986: 55-91; Rosie 2001: ch. 6; Treble 1980), but the main further change was in the ending of selection for secondary schooling in all Scottish public-sector schools after 1965. The effect on Catholic schools was particularly pronounced, because previously a disproportionate number of them had not offered full academic courses, and the result since then has been a larger-than-average rise in attainment in Catholic schools and in

the Catholic population (McPherson and Willms 1986; Paterson 2000a; Payne and Ford 1977; Willms 1992).

There are both similarities to and differences from Northern Ireland in this role for education and the state. Catholic attainment has risen there too, and one reason for the emergence of a new Catholic middle class may be the employment opportunities in workplaces that are not controlled locally (Breen and Whelan 1999). On the other hand, the state has intervened in different ways in the two places: in contrast to Scotland, Catholic schools in Northern Ireland are not fully within the public sector, and Catholic rights are entrenched in legislation. Scottish Catholic schools remain therefore both more important to the opportunities available to Catholics and also less autonomous in the ways they seek to do that: despite the guarantee of continuing church influence over the curriculum and over the appointment of teachers in the 1918 Act, in practice Catholic secondary schools have tended to offer broadly the same courses as other schools, teachers in Catholic schools have passed through broadly the same kinds of initial preparation and professional development, and they are members of broadly the same professional associations.

Previous empirical investigation of the relationship among religion, education and social mobility has been hampered by the absence of any survey data with the full range of relevant information and with adequate sample sizes. For example, both Paterson (2000b) and Williams and Walls (2000) use the 1997 Scottish Election Survey, but, because the sample size was only 882, reliable inferences could be drawn only at the expense of dichotomising measures of social class and of age. The research reported here uses the much larger Scottish Household Survey of 2001. The main questions we examine are whether social mobility differs between the three largest religious groups in Scotland, and what, if any, the role of education might be in that. This is of course only one dimension of inequality among religious groups: a fuller treatment of many other aspects is provided by Bruce et al (2004).

Data and Methods

The Scottish Household Survey has been carried out annually since 1999 on behalf of the Scottish Executive. It is a survey of households, and the main interview is done with a randomly selected adult (aged at least 16) within each household; we analyse information from these people here. The households are selected using the Postcode Address File, and the sampling frame is all households living at private addresses; households are selected randomly within addresses. A simple random sample is taken in densely populated areas, and a clustered sample (within census enumeration districts) in less densely populated areas. The response rate in 2001 was 67 per cent, and weights are available to compensate for non-response. Further details are available from the survey's web site (in the reference list below).

The 2001 survey included questions on both mothers' and fathers' occupations when the respondent was aged about 14. We define the class of origin by the higher of the statuses of mother and father, and, where one parent was unemployed or economically inactive, by the status of the employed parent. Current class is defined by respondent's occupation, or by the occupation of the highest-income householder where the respondent had had no occupation within the previous five years. These have been coded here into the Goldthorpe class scheme (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1993: 38-9); further information is provided by Iannelli and Paterson (2005). We use a six-class summary of the full Goldthorpe scheme, as noted in, for example, Table II.

Unfortunately for our purposes, the survey asked all respondents only about their current religion, not about their religion of upbringing. We discuss possible biases resulting from this later. Although the conclusion there is broadly that, for investigating the association of social mobility and religious group, the bias is probably small, we still have to be careful about inferring causality: throughout the analysis, it remains possible that people choose religious affiliations – including continuing to adhere to a prior affiliation – in order to achieve occupational advancement (in other words, that occupation causes religious affiliation) rather than the causal process being the other way round (religion offering or restricting opportunities). We exclude all respondents who were not in one of three large groups: 'no religion', 'Church of Scotland', and 'Roman Catholic'; these groups contained 90.2 per cent of the whole sample.

A further unfortunate gap in the survey is any information on place of birth. However, because 85 per cent of the working-age residents of Scotland in 2001 were born in Scotland (Registrar General for Scotland 2003, Table S15), by far the strongest influence on the patterns reported here will be from those who were born in the country, and so may be broadly attributable to indigenous social change.

We attempt to measure change over time by means of the cohort in which respondents were born. This is not without problems, but is the best that may be achieved in the absence of repeated cross-sectional surveys over a long period of time. The cohorts used are people born in 1937-46, 1947-56, 1957-66 and 1967-76; the rationale for this choice is discussed by Iannelli and Paterson (2005). We restrict attention to that age range because the questions about educational attainment were not asked of people aged over 65, and because many people younger than 25 were still in full-time education. Highest educational attainment is summarised into five levels: no formal qualifications, attainment at lower secondary level, attainment at upper secondary level, higher education below degree, and degree. The survey did not ask about the school which the respondent attended, and so we cannot investigate the specific effects of Catholic schools. We also investigate interactions with gender.

We investigate both absolute and relative mobility. Absolute mobility is simply a description of flows between social classes, and is important because it is what people experience. To compare distributions of classes, we sometimes also use the dissimilarity index, which compares two distributions (for example, in Table II, the distribution of origins and of destinations within each religious group): the more dissimilar two distributions are, the larger is the value of the index. Relative mobility measures the relative chances of members of two origin classes reaching a certain class destination: as Marshall et al (1997), for example, argue, understanding relative mobility is an important aspect of investigating social inequality and social justice. We measure relative mobility by odds ratios analysed by means of loglinear modelling (carried out by the software LEM: Vermunt 1997). The general approach to log-linear modelling which we use is outlined by, for example, Erikson and Goldthorpe (1993: 28-64).

In our notation, single variables refer to main effects, for example O to the main effect of class of origin. Concatenations of variables refer to interactions: for example, OE refers to the interaction of origin class and education. The fit of models is measured in the usual way by the L^2 statistic, which is the same as the log likelihood ratio and thus is (under the relevant null hypothesis) approximately distributed as a chi-squared variable.

The broad questions that were outlined in the Introduction are focused into the following three groups:

- What are the religious differences in the distributions of class origins and class destinations, in the movement between these (absolute mobility), and in the association of these (relative mobility, or social fluidity)? The main tables pertaining to these questions are Tables II, III, IV and V.
- Do changes in social fluidity across cohorts vary among people with different religious affiliation? The relevant tables are III, VI, VII and VIII.
- Are there religious differences in the association of origins and education, in the association of education and destinations, or in the role of education in social fluidity, and do any of these vary over cohorts? The tables are IX, X, XI, XII and XIII.

Results

As a preliminary, Table I shows the differences among cohorts in the pattern of religious affiliation, and in the sample sizes available for analysis (although, as may be seen from later tables, these sizes fall further when respondents with missing data on social class are excluded). Despite what we have said about possible biases resulting from the use of birth cohorts and current religion, the pattern shown in the table is consistent with much that has been written about the secularising of Scottish society (Brown 1997; Bruce et al 2004): notably, it confirms that the Church of Scotland has been declining from the mid-1950s (when the oldest cohort here were reaching adulthood).

(a) Religious differences in mobility patterns

Table II shows the distributions of origin class and of destination class by religion. Among origins, current Catholics had the lowest status, and those in the Church of Scotland were also somewhat lower than the currently non-religious. The destination distributions are much more similar, and as a result the difference between the distributions of origin and destination is greatest for Catholics and lowest for the non-religious (as measured by the dissimilarity indexes in Table II). The dissimilarity indexes comparing origins among religions are shown in Table III (the rows labelled 'all'): comparing Catholics with either of the other two groups, the difference is much less for destinations than for origins (2 compared to 7 for comparison with members of the Church of Scotland, and 6 compared to 13 for comparison with people of no religion). For comparing the Church of Scotland group with the no religion group, the index for origins is the same as for destinations (6 each), and so there is no evidence of any tendency for these two groups to grow either more similar or more different.

Table IV shows the amount of absolute mobility by religion. There is some weak evidence that the Catholic group is more likely to be upwardly mobile than the other two: more detailed inspection of the data showed that this was mainly because of movement out of the lowest class, especially into the routine non-manual and skilled manual classes. Nevertheless, even the proportion of upward mobility in Table IV does not vary enormously among religious groups, and the proportion of downward mobility is almost the same in the three groups. Because of this, and of the pattern of origins (in Table II), further detailed inspection shows the Catholic professional classes to contain higher proportions of people from working class origins (the lowest two categories) than the other two religious groups: 44 per cent of Catholics in the

higher professional class were from such origins, compared to 29 per cent of people in the Church of Scotland and 26 per cent of people with no religion. Similar patterns were true also of the lower professional class (respective proportions from the lowest two classes of 42 per cent, 40 per cent and 36 per cent), the routine non-manual category (65 per cent, 54 per cent, 52 per cent), and – for movement from the unskilled class – of the skilled manual category (46 per cent, 39 per cent and 39 per cent).

That last set of comments is perfectly consistent, however, with there being no religious difference in the association of origins and destinations: it could well arise as the result of constant social fluidity operating on different origin distributions. The result of the log-linear models reported in Table V confirm this. In fact the whole pattern of association among origins, destinations and religion may be explained by common social fluidity (the OD interaction), and by religious differences in origin distributions (OR): model 3 fits the data well. Religious differences in destinations are not enough to explain the patterns: model 4 does not fit. The main point is that there is no evidence of any need for the three-way interaction ODR, and hence no evidence that social fluidity (OD) varies by current religion.

Further modelling that is not shown in Table V found that none of this varied by gender. There were gender differences in destinations (as is commonly found in studies of social class: for Scotland, see, for example, Paterson et al 2004): there were proportionately fewer women than men in the higher professional class and the skilled working class, and more in the lower professional class and the routine non-manual class. There were also quite small gender differences in religious affiliation: again as is often reported, a lower proportion of women than of men were not religious, the balance being shared fairly proportionately between the two other religious groups. But there was no evidence of any gender differences in the three two-way interactions shown in Table V: that is, denoting gender by 'G', no evidence of three-way interactions ODG, ORG or DRG.

(b) Variation across cohorts

Next we turn to the second set of questions asked earlier, whether any of these conclusions vary across cohort. Table VI is analogous to Table II, showing for each cohort the distributions of origins and of destinations by religion. It is clear from the dissimilarity indexes in this table comparing origins and destinations within cohorts that, for each religious group, origins and destinations are much more similar in the younger cohorts than in the older, and that the fall was particularly striking for Catholics, from a peak in the second cohort of 45 to just 14. The convergence of religious groups is also seen from the dissimilarity indexes by cohort shown in Table III: there is steady convergence of origins across cohorts for all three pairs, and for most of the cohorts in the destinations. The only exception concerns the youngest cohort in the Church of Scotland, where there is some evidence of a small rise in distinctiveness again.

One of the reasons for the convergence of origins and destinations is that the parents of people in the last cohort would in large numbers have been people who were born in the first or second cohorts. The high rates of absolute upward mobility of the two older cohorts – induced largely by the growth of service-class occupations in the three decades after the second world war – created for them unprecedented opportunities to occupy service-class roles. But the children of these service-class people could not move up any higher, and, as a group, could not maintain their class

position while previous cohorts were still in employment because opportunities to enter the service class did not continued to expand rapidly enough. The result, in Table VII, is that the youngest cohort shows lower rates of absolute upward mobility, and higher rates of absolute downward mobility, than the older ones. This broad effect of social change on rates of absolute mobility is discussed in more detail by Iannelli and Paterson (2005); see also Noble (2000) and Payne and Roberts (2002). The main point here is that the processes seem to have been very similar for each of the three religious groups. Older Catholics experience more absolute upward mobility than the other two groups, for reasons we discussed earlier, but in the youngest cohort the patterns are almost the same in each group.

The modelling to test these observations is summarised in Table VIII. The main effects and the two-way interactions involving origins, destinations and cohort are all needed, resulting in model 2; for further discussion of the relationship among these three, see Iannelli and Paterson (2005). But the remaining variation may then be entirely accounted for by the term CR, which records the differences in religious affiliation across cohorts (as was recorded in Table I). Models 4, 5 and 6 show that the terms OR and DR (even both together) are not enough to account for that variation: that is, the differences among religious groups in the distribution of origins or of destinations (Table II) do not explain the religious differences in the tables of origins-by-destinations-by-cohorts. All that is needed is the term CR, which adds almost as much explanatory power after the terms OR and DR as before (the effect of model 7 compared to that of model 3): in essence, in older cohorts there are fewer people in the non-religious version of the origins-by-destinations table than there are in younger cohorts, but the 'extra' people thus recruited to the non-religious group do not behave any differently from the religious people they left behind.

There was, again, no evidence of any gender differences in these models. In fact, the only three-way interaction involving gender that even approached statistical significance was DCG (L^2 value of 23.1 on 15 degrees of freedom, p-value of 0.08), which indicates a possible gender difference in the change of destinations over cohorts, as the growth in female employment in professional jobs, and the decline in manual employment, was greater than among men. But what was undoubtedly absent was any three-way interaction involving religion as well as gender.

(c) Education

The final set of questions concerns the role of education in mediating the relationship between origins and destinations, and specifically whether any such role varies by religion. Table IX summarises the patterns of educational attainment by cohort and religion. In each religious group, there is a sharp drop across the cohorts in the proportion of people with no formal attainment. The fall is greatest among Catholics because the oldest generation among them had a much higher level than the other two groups, whereas in the youngest cohort there is no difference among the religious groups in this respect. At the other end of the distribution of attainment, there is also a large rise in the proportion of people with any higher education. Within that, there has also been a rise in the proportion with degrees, although that this is not so clear for the non-religious as for the other two groups might tend to suggest that abandoning any religion could be a secularising consequence of degree-level study, so that some of the graduates among older people who were brought up as Catholics or in the Church of Scotland might in fact be appearing here in the non-religious segment of the table. This speculation was partly confirmed when (as explained later) we picked out in the

group of people with no current religion those who had been brought up without a religion: in that sub-group, the proportion with a degree was smaller than in the 'no religion' part of Table IX, although there was no more evidence of a rise than in that table (the proportions being 18 per cent in the oldest cohort, through 20 per cent to 22 per cent and then 20 per cent again in the last cohort). However, the suggested explanation cannot be the whole truth, because if it were we might expect the proportion of the non-religious groups who hold a degree to rise across the cohorts.

Table X then shows differences in attainment by class of origin, the education variable having here been re-coded to record thresholds of attainment (for example, attaining an upper secondary certificate or better). The class differences are similar for each religious group, and also are far larger than any religious differences. The rewards to education in the labour market are, further, similar in each religious group, as Table XI shows: for example, in each group some 80-83 per cent of degree holders are in professional occupations. In this sense, there is no evidence that the labour market is not operating meritocratically. The broad commonality of labour market reward among religious groups is all the more remarkable when we consider that Table XI is not broken down by cohort, and that we have a measure only of current religion. There is certainly no evidence here that, for example, Catholics are widely discriminated against in the labour market, or extensively have to abandon their religion to gain high-status employment.

These observations are confirmed more rigorously by the modelling shown in Table XII, which leaves cohort aside. The fact that model 4 fits the data adequately shows that the relationship of origins to attainment and of attainment to destinations may be captured by the terms OE and DE alone. Thus there is no need for the full interaction term ODE: social fluidity does not vary by attainment. More directly relevant to our present purposes, however, is the absence of any interactions involving both religion and education. When the interaction of R and E is added, in model 5, the model is admittedly improved, and so – despite the statistical adequacy of model 4 – we should conclude that attainment does vary by religion (as the right-hand margin of Table IX suggests). But there is clearly no evidence of any variation in this by origin. Differences in attainment among origin classes (OE) do not vary by religion, and the relationship of attainment to class destination (DE) does not vary by religion. In further models not shown in the table, we also found that none of these conclusions varied by gender. There was no need for any three-way interaction involving gender and religion, and indeed, of all the three-way interactions including gender, only DEG was statistically significant in the sense of having a p value of less than 0.05 (thus indicating that, unlike for religion, the relationship of attainment and class destination varies by gender).

Table XIII, finally, includes cohort in this analysis. As with model 3 in Table VIII, there is evidence here that all the variation involving religion may be captured in the term CR, in the sense that model 3 here fits the data well. However, comparison of models 4 and 5 in Table XIII shows that there is evidence that the trends in educational attainment over cohorts vary by religion, just as we concluded from Table IX. But that was the only three-way interaction involving religion that was statistically significant. Thus most of the change over cohorts in the association of origins, destinations and education is not differentiated by religion. Once more also, none of these conclusions varied by gender, and so the patterns we have found are similar to those reported by Breen et al (1999: 204) for both parts of Ireland: they

found, as we have done, no gender or class effects on religious differences in attainment.

The effects of religious conversion

We investigate the effect of our having information only on current religion in two ways. The Scottish Election Survey of 1997 did ask about both current religion and religion of upbringing, and also gathered information that allows origin and destination class to be derived. The sample size is, however, much smaller than would be desirable for this kind of analysis (a total of 882 respondents), and so it is not reliable to calculate rates of movement between religions for all combinations of religion of origin, current religion, and origin and destination class. Nevertheless, the partial information presented in Table XIV suggests that our analysis is unlikely to have been strongly biased by movement away from origin religion. For each category of origin religion shown in the table, there is little or no class effect on the likelihood of conversion to another religious group, whether class is defined by origin or destination. The only exception is that people of Church of Scotland origin may have been more likely to convert if they were of middle class origin than if they were of working class origin. The effect on our analysis would tend to be that we have too few middle class people currently in the Church of Scotland, and so we may have underestimated absolute upward mobility in that religious group. In Table VII, that would mean that the Church of Scotland group might appear to be rather closer to the non-religious than it ought to be, and rather further from the Catholics. But the comparisons of the Catholic population with the majority experience – the topic on which we have concentrated most attention in the paper – is unlikely to have been biased by the patterns of religious movement shown in Table XIV.

The second way in which we can analyse possible biases resulting from using current religion is by means of partial information about origin religion in the Scottish Household Survey itself. That question was asked only of people who reported no current religion. The rationale was presumably that most movement among religious groups in the last 40 years has been away from organised religion altogether (a point confirmed by analysis of the Election Survey)

A 'synthetic religion' variable was constructed using origin religion where current religion was 'none', and using current religion otherwise. As earlier, we then restricted attention to those who had no religion, were in the Church of Scotland, or were Roman Catholic. The main general change was to decrease the proportion in 'no religion' from 32 per cent in Table I to 15 per cent; the changes for the other two categories were from 51 per cent to 65 per cent for Church of Scotland and from 17 per cent to 21 per cent for Catholic. However, despite that, the effect on the analysis was actually quite small. The only substantial changes to the descriptive analysis were associated with the fact that the synthetic non-religious group had a rather greater proportion of people in current class VII than the non-religious group shown in the tables (20 per cent compared to 16 per cent in Table II), mainly because of greater absolute downward mobility from class III and more people stable in class VII. The changes to other tables were consequences of this – for example, in this group overall more absolute downward mobility and more immobility than in Table VII. As noted earlier, the non-religious according to this synthetic variable had lower percentages with degrees in each cohort in Table IX. By contrast even to these fairly small changes for the non-religious group, the changes for the other two groups were very small, essentially reflecting the fact that most (82 per cent) of the larger Church of

Scotland group were in fact currently in that church, a proportion exceeded (85 per cent) in the Catholic group.

The results of the statistical modelling (Tables V, VIII, XII and XIII) were affected in only small ways, and these all tended to reduce the significance of religious differences. In summary of the analysis of synthetic religion, we can say that the results were not fundamentally affected by having used current religion, and that, to the extent that they were, it was mostly to underestimate the extent of similarity and convergence among the religious groups.

Conclusions

In some respects, this analysis merely confirms the findings of other work. The much smaller religious differences in social status in our younger cohorts than in the oldest suggests that there has been convergence of religious groups. In particular, therefore, younger Catholics are not concentrated in working-class occupations in the way that their forebears in Scotland have been. The result of this large shift in the social status of Catholics is that a larger proportion of Catholic professionals than of other professionals had their own origins in the working class. But the modelling we have done confirms that this does not mean there has been greater social fluidity among Catholics: the relative chances of reaching a high-status destination as opposed to a lower-status one, when comparing any two classes of origin, are the same in all religious groups. This conclusion is similar to that reached for Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland by Breen and Whelan (1999: 329).

The reason why this can have happened is essentially the equalising of educational attainment among religious groups over time. Probably as a result of the academically successful system of Catholic schools, younger Catholics have almost the same distribution of attainment as younger people in other religious groups. That is not the case among older generations. These credentials are then rewarded in the labour market in broadly the same way for all religious groups, regardless of class of origin. In that sense, Catholics have benefited from meritocracy: the schools have given them access to certificates, and the certificates have allowed them to demonstrate their merit in seeking employment and social status. Although a more subtle analysis would have to take account of others ways than educational certificates of measuring merit (Marshall et al 1997: 133-57), we have no evidence here that the conclusions of that would differ among religious groups: Scotland has not had any system of quotas in employment, nor even any kind of equal-rights legislation that might tend to compensate for any disadvantage that Catholics might face. The religious convergence of education and of class destination has happened through supply-side reforms (relating to schooling) and the normal operation of a labour market much more subject to international standards and pressures than half a century or more ago. In that sense, our conclusions differ from those by Breen et al (1999: 204) for Northern Ireland, where legislation was used to enforce equal opportunities in employment.

Our analysis has gone beyond the findings of previous research mainly in the statistical power of the large samples that we had at our disposal, far larger than any previous analysis at a Scottish level of the relationship of religion with social mobility and education. This is more than usually important when addressing the questions we raised at the beginning. When trying to test a negative proposition – that there are no religious differences in, say, social fluidity – having access only to small samples will make it more likely that we will accept this conclusion simply because the evidence is

not strong enough to detect small differences. No sample is large enough to be sure that there are no differences, but that we have reasonable statistical power here for investigating three-way interactions is illustrated by our ability to detect (in the comparison of models 4 and 5 of Table XIII) the religious differences in changes in educational attainment across cohorts shown in Table IX.

Our analysis has also gone beyond earlier work by being able to look for any religious differences in the rather different mobility experience of the generation who reached adulthood in the 1980s and 1990s (our youngest cohort here). As we have discussed more fully elsewhere (Iannelli and Paterson 2005), rates of absolute upward mobility have been declining, because the parents of recent generations have themselves benefited from earlier waves of upward movement, and middle class opportunities have not expanded as rapidly as the resulting expansion of middle class origins. A new test of the convergence of the experience of religious groups is then whether they all experience this shift towards stability or absolute downward mobility to the same extent; and the answer is that they do, as Table VII shows descriptively and as the modelling in Table VIII confirmed. The mitigating of religious divisions in Scotland is confirmed as strongly by this commonality of diminishing opportunity as it was by the increasingly common experience of upward movement in earlier decades.

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Table I

Current religion by birth cohort, among people aged 25-64 in 2001

Column percentages	<i>Birth cohort</i>				All
	1937-46	1947-56	1957-66	1967-76	
no religion	17.8	29.9	33.6	44.1	31.7
Church of Scotland	65.8	54.1	48.1	39.0	51.3
Roman Catholic	16.3	16.0	18.3	16.9	16.9
<i>Sample size</i>	<i>1904</i>	<i>2038</i>	<i>2452</i>	<i>2164</i>	<i>8558</i>

Weighted; sample sizes unweighted.

Table II

Distribution of origins and of destinations, by current religion, among people aged 25-64 in 2001

Column percentages <i>Class</i>	no religion		Church of Scotland		Roman Catholic	
	origin	destination	origin	destination	origin	destination
Higher grade professional (I)	12.0	16.4	8.8	14.1	7.0	15.3
Lower grade professional (II)	16.2	28.4	13.0	25.1	10.7	24.4
Routine non-manual (IIIa,b)	15.1	20.7	16.0	23.7	13.9	23.0
Self-employed (IVa,b,c)	8.1	5.0	8.1	4.8	7.3	4.2
Skilled (V,VI)	21.8	13.7	24.4	16.6	27.6	16.2
Unskilled (VIIa,b)	26.8	15.9	29.7	15.6	33.5	16.9
Dissimilarity index comparing origins and destinations	22		25		31	
<i>Sample size</i>	2405	2069	3893	3268	1211	958

Origin class defined by higher of status of mother and father; destination class defined by respondent's current or latest job or by job of highest-income person in household when respondent had no class. Omits people who could not be assigned to classes in these ways, and also people who did not choose one of the displayed religious identities. Categories of Goldthorpe scheme contributing to each summary category are shown in brackets.

Weighted; sample sizes unweighted.

Table III

Dissimilarity index comparing current religion, by birth cohort

	Church of Scotland		Roman Catholic	
	comparing origins	comparing destinations	comparing origins	comparing destinations
no religion:				
all	6	6	13	6
born 1937-46	8	11	14	11
born 1947-56	8	11	23	6
born 1957-66	4	6	8	6
born 1967-76	4	8	5	4
Church of Scotland:				
all			7	2
born 1937-46			9	8
born 1947-56			16	9
born 1957-66			7	3
born 1967-76			5	7

sources: Tables II and VI.

Table IV

Social mobility, by current religion, among people aged 25-64 in 2001

<i>Mobility (column percentages)</i>	no religion	Church of Scotland	Roman Catholic
downward	25.0	23.2	23.3
immobile	24.8	25.9	19.5
upward	50.2	50.9	57.2
<i>Sample size</i>	1837	2973	834

Based on class categories shown in Table II.

Weighted; sample sizes unweighted.

Table V

Results of log-linear models of origin class, current class and current religion

	Model	df	L ²
1	O, D, R	95	782.1*
2	O, D, R, OD	70	102.8*
	(comparison of (2) and (3))	(-10)	(-36.4)*
3	O, D, R, OD, OR	60	66.4
	(comparison of (2) and (4))	(-10)	(-19.3)*
4	O, D, R, OD, DR	60	83.5*

Unweighted data. An asterisk indicates p-value less than 0.05.

df = residual degrees of freedom.

O = origin class (Goldthorpe with 6 categories).

D = current class (Goldthorpe with 6 categories).

R = current religion (no religion, Church of Scotland, Roman Catholic).

Table VI

Distribution of origins and of destinations, by birth cohort and religion, among people aged 25-64 in 2001

Column percentages within religion		no religion							
Class:	birth cohort	1937-46		1947-56		1957-66		1967-76	
		origin	dest'n	origin	dest'n	origin	dest'n	origin	dest'n
Higher grade professional		8.8	15.4	10.3	19.2	11.5	17.1	14.9	13.9
Lower grade professional		10.2	26.0	15.6	30.3	16.1	29.0	19.1	27.2
Routine non-manual		9.2	16.3	15.6	17.3	14.6	20.0	17.4	25.1
Self-employed		9.8	6.3	8.0	6.2	8.2	4.2	7.6	4.5
Skilled		21.7	14.4	22.1	13.5	23.8	13.8	19.7	13.4
Unskilled		40.3	21.6	28.3	13.5	25.8	16.0	21.4	15.9
Dissimilarity index comparing origins and destinations		30		25		24		16	
Sample size		306	201	541	456	745	685	813	727

Church of Scotland

Class:	birth cohort	1937-46		1947-56		1957-66		1967-76	
		origin	dest'n	origin	dest'n	origin	dest'n	origin	dest'n
Higher grade professional		4.8	12.1	7.4	12.0	10.4	16.4	14.4	16.1
Lower grade professional		8.0	19.2	11.7	28.5	15.7	26.2	18.8	25.6
Routine non-manual		11.6	21.9	14.9	25.1	18.3	24.0	20.9	23.5
Self-employed		8.9	6.8	8.9	4.4	7.4	4.8	6.8	3.0
Skilled		27.0	19.0	26.6	14.5	23.0	15.0	19.2	19.4
Unskilled		39.7	21.0	30.5	15.5	25.1	13.7	20.0	12.4
Dissimilarity index comparing origins and destinations		29		32		22		11	
Sample size		1099	754	1002	853	1040	953	752	708

Roman Catholic

Class:	birth cohort	1937-46		1947-56		1957-66		1967-76	
		origin	dest'n	origin	dest'n	origin	dest'n	origin	dest'n
Higher grade professional		3.3	11.0	4.1	18.1	7.1	15.7	13.1	14.7
Lower grade professional		7.7	22.1	5.1	25.8	12.2	25.0	17.4	23.8
Routine non-manual		5.1	20.3	11.1	21.2	18.3	23.6	19.1	25.5
Self-employed		7.7	3.5	6.1	5.8	8.4	3.7	6.7	3.8
Skilled		32.0	16.9	31.8	15.8	24.9	16.3	22.8	16.1
Unskilled		44.1	26.2	41.7	13.5	29.2	15.7	20.8	16.1
Dissimilarity index comparing origins and destinations		37		45		27		14	
Sample size		271	155	256	201	381	330	303	272

Origin class defined by higher of status of mother and father; destination class defined by respondent's current or latest job or by job of highest-income person in household when respondent had no class. Omits people who could not be assigned to classes in these ways, and people who did not choose one of the displayed religious identities.

Weighted; sample sizes unweighted.

Table VII

Social mobility, by birth cohort and current religion, among people aged 25-64 in 2001

*Mobility
(column percentages
within religion)*

	<i>birth cohort</i>	1937-46	1947-56	no religion		
				1957-66	1967-76	All
downward		21.1	19.7	26.4	28.6	25.0
immobile		23.2	26.0	22.3	26.9	24.8
upward		55.8	54.3	51.3	44.4	50.2
<i>Sample size</i>		183	408	612	634	1837
Church of Scotland						
	<i>birth cohort</i>	1937-46	1947-56	1957-66	1967-76	All
downward		21.1	20.7	23.4	28.8	23.2
immobile		23.8	24.9	27.5	27.1	25.9
upward		55.1	54.4	49.1	44.1	50.9
<i>Sample size</i>		668	786	874	645	2973
Roman Catholic						
	<i>birth cohort</i>	1937-46	1947-56	1957-66	1967-76	All
downward		21.6	16.8	23.6	30.2	23.3
immobile		20.3	13.3	18.2	26.4	19.5
upward		58.2	69.9	58.3	43.4	57.2
<i>Sample size</i>		139	175	290	230	834

Based on class categories shown in Table VI.

Weighted; sample sizes unweighted.

Table VIII

Results of log-linear models of origin class, current class, current religion and birth cohort

	Model	df	L ²
1	O, D, C, R	416	1564.6*
2	O, D, C, R, OD, OC, DC	361	575.5*
	(comparison of (2) and (3))	(-6)	(-199.7)*
3	O, D, C, R, OD, OC, DC, CR	355	375.8
	(comparison of (2) and (4))	(-10)	(-19.3)*
4	O, D, C, R, OD, OC, DC, DR	351	556.2*
	(comparison of (2) and (5))	(-10)	(-36.4)*
5	O, D, C, R, OD, OC, DC, OR	351	539.1*
6	O, D, C, R, OD, OC, DC, OR, DR	341	527.6*
	(comparison of (6) and (7))	(-6)	(-190.2)*
7	O, D, C, R, OD, OC, DC, OR, DR, CR	335	337.4

Unweighted data. An asterisk indicates p-value less than 0.05.

df = residual degrees of freedom.

O = origin class (Goldthorpe with 6 categories).

D = current class (Goldthorpe with 6 categories).

R = current religion (no religion, Church of Scotland, Roman Catholic).

C = birth cohort (4 categories: 1937-46, 1947-56, 1957-66, 1967-76).

Table IX

Educational attainment, by birth cohort and current religion, among people aged 25-64 in 2001

*Highest attainment
(column percentages
within religion)*

<i>birth cohort</i>	no religion					All
	1937-46	1947-56	1957-66	1967-76		
None	38.1	20.6	19.9	12.7	19.9	
Lower secondary education ¹	22.4	22.0	23.6	28.0	24.5	
Upper secondary education ²	13.3	19.0	21.1	22.0	19.9	
Higher education below degree ³	3.8	8.9	9.9	12.2	9.7	
Degree	22.4	29.4	25.5	25.1	26.0	
<i>Sample size</i>	356	623	842	960	2781	

Church of Scotland

<i>birth cohort</i>	1937-46	1947-56	1957-66	1967-76	All
None	38.3	25.1	17.7	10.8	24.2
Lower secondary education ¹	32.1	26.7	25.2	27.4	27.9
Upper secondary education ²	13.9	19.9	26.4	25.8	21.1
Higher education below degree ³	4.0	6.7	8.1	12.3	7.4
Degree	11.7	21.6	22.5	23.6	19.5
<i>Sample size</i>	1226	1107	1159	843	4335

Roman Catholic

<i>birth cohort</i>	1937-46	1947-56	1957-66	1967-76	All
None	53.8	34.1	24.8	13.0	30.4
Lower secondary education ¹	22.1	27.7	24.2	28.5	25.6
Upper secondary education ²	9.0	15.3	21.2	19.5	16.8
Higher education below degree ³	2.6	3.5	9.6	13.3	7.5
Degree	12.5	19.4	20.1	25.7	19.7
<i>Sample size</i>	312	306	448	359	1425

¹ For example, pass in Standard Grade, O Grade, Lower Grade of Scottish Leaving Certificate.

² For example, pass in Higher Grade, Higher Grade of Scottish Leaving Certificate.

³ For example, HND, HNC, nursing certificate, primary teaching diploma.

Weighted; sample sizes unweighted.

Table X

Educational attainment, by current religion and origin class, among people aged 25-64 in 2001

<i>Religion:</i>	<i>Origin class</i>					
	Higher grade professional	Lower grade professional	Routine non-manual	Self-employed	Skilled	Unskilled
Percentage attaining at least upper secondary education						
No religion	85.6	76.2	63.5	59.8	50.2	35.1
Church of Scotland	82.4	72.0	58.9	51.2	42.7	28.2
Roman Catholic	88.6	69.3	54.2	50.0	39.5	29.0
Percentage attaining at least higher education certificate						
No religion	70.1	55.2	40.0	39.2	29.8	15.6
Church of Scotland	60.2	49.8	31.3	27.6	19.4	12.2
Roman Catholic	61.8	50.4	33.3	31.9	22.4	15.0
Percentage attaining degree						
No religion	61.9	44.6	27.1	28.8	19.2	8.7
Church of Scotland	50.7	37.1	24.6	19.1	12.4	7.3
Roman Catholic	49.4	38.0	25.4	28.7	15.6	8.6
<i>Sample size</i>						
No religion	290	379	370	214	515	633
Church of Scotland	338	507	614	366	904	1157
Roman Catholic	84	138	173	97	325	393

Origin class defined by higher of status of mother and father. Omits people who could not be assigned to a class in this way, and also people who did not choose one of the displayed religious identities.

Weighted; sample sizes unweighted.

Table XI**Destination class, by highest educational attainment and current religion, among people aged 25-64 in 2001**

Row percentages	<i>Destination class</i>						<i>Sample size</i>
<i>Religion:</i>	Higher grade professional	Lower grade professional	Routine non-manual	Self-employed	Skilled	Unskilled	
At least upper secondary certificate							
No religion	23.6	37.7	16.3	4.4	10.7	7.4	1263
Church of Scotland	21.7	35.6	20.3	3.3	12.8	6.3	1731
Roman Catholic	23.8	35.3	21.0	3.1	11.0	5.9	504
At least higher education certificate							
No religion	30.8	41.7	13.1	3.1	5.4	5.9	822
Church of Scotland	29.9	45.1	14.1	2.2	5.7	3.0	992
Roman Catholic	30.2	42.0	19.3	1.4	5.2	2.0	321
Degree							
No religion	35.4	47.9	8.5	2.4	2.2	3.6	596
Church of Scotland	34.4	48.8	9.9	1.3	3.8	1.8	734
Roman Catholic	36.0	44.4	14.4	1.2	3.2	0.8	230

Destination class defined by respondent's current or latest job or by job of highest-income person in household when respondent had no class. Omits people who could not be assigned to a class in this way, and also people who did not choose one of the displayed religious identities.

Weighted; sample sizes unweighted.

Table XII

Results of log-linear models of origin class, current class, current religion and highest educational attainment

	Model	df	L ²
1	O, D, R, E	523	3646.5*
2	O, D, R, E, OD, OR, DR	478	2920.9*
3	O, D, R, E, OD, OR, DR, OE	458	1901.6*
4	O, D, R, E, OD, OR, DR, OE, DE	438	482.0
	(comparison of (4) and (5))	(-8)	(-40.8)*
5	O, D, R, E, OD, OR, DR, OE, DE, RE	430	441.2
	(comparison of (5) and (6))	(-40)	(-48.5)
6	O, D, R, E, OD, OR, DR, OE, DE, RE, ORE	390	392.7
	(comparison of (5) and (7))	(-40)	(-39.7)
7	O, D, R, E, OD, OR, DR, OE, DE, RE, DRE	390	401.5

Unweighted data. An asterisk indicates p-value less than 0.05.

df = residual degrees of freedom.

O = origin class (Goldthorpe with 6 categories).

D = current class (Goldthorpe with 6 categories).

R = current religion (no religion, Church of Scotland, Roman Catholic).

E = highest educational attainment (5 categories: none, lower secondary, upper secondary, higher education below degree, degree).

Table XIII**Results of log-linear models of origin class, current class, current religion, highest educational attainment and birth cohort**

	Model	df	L ²
1	O, D, C, R, E	2140	6049.4*
2	O, D, C, R, E, OD, OC, DC, OE, DE, CE	2033	2296.0*
	(comparison of (2) and (3))	(-6)	(-197.2)*
3	O, D, C, R, E, OD, OC, DC, OE, DE, CE, CR	2027	2098.8
4	all main effects and all 2- way interactions	1999	2035.7
	(comparison of (4) and (5))	(-24)	(-39.3)*
5	all main effects and all 2- way interactions, CRE	1975	1996.4

Unweighted data. An asterisk indicates p-value less than 0.05.

df = residual degrees of freedom.

O = origin class (Goldthorpe with 6 categories).

D = current class (Goldthorpe with 6 categories).

R = current religion (no religion, Church of Scotland, Roman Catholic).

E = highest educational attainment (5 categories: none, lower secondary, upper secondary, higher education below degree, degree).

C = birth cohort (4 categories: 1937-46, 1947-56, 1957-66, 1967-76).

Table XIV

Movement from religion of upbringing, by religion of upbringing, among people living in Scotland in 1999

<i>% who have moved from religion of upbringing¹</i>	<i>religion of upbringing</i>		
	no religion	Church of Scotland	Roman Catholic
middle class origin	8.6 (28)	34.9 (134)	26.8 (37)
working class origin	8.1 (37)	25.9 (264)	22.4 (82)
currently middle class	4.8 (38)	27.1 (248)	21.4 (69)
currently working class	6.7 (38)	33.7 (207)	19.5 (78)

¹ Excludes from the comparison of current religion and religion of upbringing all who gave an unspecified Christian denomination or a non-Christian religion, or who did not reply.

Middle class is Goldthorpe categories I, II, III and IV; working class is categories V, VI and VII: see Table II. Origin class defined in terms of father's occupation only.

Percentages are weighted; unweighted sample sizes in brackets.

Source: Scottish Election Survey 1997: see Paterson (2000b).
